debate-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex architectural decisions and design trade-offs provided by users, which are then distributed to multiple sub-agents representing different perspectives. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the user-provided context contains instructions designed to bias or override the sub-agents' logic.
- Ingestion points: User-provided inputs are ingested via the 'Decision Framing Template' (Decision, Context, Constraints, Evaluation Criteria) as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' prompts when interpolating user context into the perspective profiles.
- Capability inventory: The workflow involves spawning subprocesses for each perspective, using a 'builder agent' to implement the chosen approach (implying file system or environment modifications), and persisting data using
store_discovery()from theamplihack.memory.discoveriesmodule. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the input data before it is passed to the sub-agents or the builder agent.
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