git-vibe-flow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions in
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdto execute a remote shell script directly by piping it to bash:curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailscastshq/git-vibe/main/install.sh | bash. This allows for unverified arbitrary code execution from a remote source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process modifies the user's global Git configuration, which intercepts Git operations in all repositories on the host machine.
- Evidence:
git config --global core.hooksPath "${HOOK_DIR}"ininstall.shredirects all Git hooks to the tool's custom directory. - Evidence:
git config --global alias.vibe "!${BIN_DIR}/git-vibe"ininstall.shcreates a global Git alias that executes the tool's binary. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
install.shscript modifies shell initialization files to persistently alter the systemPATHenvironment variable across sessions. - Evidence: The
ensure_path_in_profilefunction ininstall.shappendsexport PATH="..."to files such as.zshrc,.bashrc, or.bash_profile. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installer script dynamically fetches the main executable binary and metadata from a remote GitHub repository at runtime.
- Evidence:
download "bin/git-vibe" "${BIN_DIR}/git-vibe"ininstall.shfetches files fromraw.githubusercontent.com.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailscastshq/git-vibe/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata