git-vibe-flow

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

• Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.90). These are direct raw GitHub URLs to install.sh scripts from an unverified/unknown account and the skill explicitly suggests running them with curl|bash, which is high-risk because remote shell scripts can execute arbitrary malicious commands even though raw.githubusercontent.com is a legitimate host.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's README and SKILL.md explicitly instruct installing via curl from raw.githubusercontent.com (e.g., "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailscastshq/git-vibe/main/install.sh | bash") and the included install.sh itself downloads and executes files from RAW_BASE ("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${REPO_SLUG}/${REF}"), which fetches public, untrusted third‑party content that can change the installed tool's behavior and thus materially influence subsequent actions.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

• Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's installer explicitly downloads and executes remote scripts at runtime (e.g., curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailscastshq/git-vibe/main/install.sh | bash and the pinned https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailscastshq/git-vibe/v0.0.1/install.sh, and the raw.githubusercontent.com/.../bin/git-vibe downloads), which performs remote code execution and is required for installation, so it is a high-risk runtime external dependency.