sales-fastmail
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install third-party community tools from personal GitHub repositories (
jmhron/FastMailMCPandMadLlama25/fastmail-mcp). These sources are not officially verified or hosted by the platform vendor, representing a supply chain risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes steps to execute remote code installation commands, such as
git clonefollowed bypip install -r requirements.txtandnpx @anthropic-ai/dxt pack. These commands download and execute content from external, untrusted sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a self-referential mechanism where the agent is instructed to read from and append to
references/learnings.md. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8), as malicious instructions could be persisted in the learnings file during one session and influence the agent's behavior in subsequent sessions. - Ingestion points: The agent reads
references/learnings.mdat the start of every invocation to gather accumulated knowledge. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the
learnings.mdfile. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read and write to local reference files and is encouraged to provide shell commands for API interaction and tool setup.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks sanitization or validation logic for the content being appended to the learnings file.
Audit Metadata