account-context
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from multiple external sources (Salesforce records, emails, documents, and Slack messages), which represents an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Salesforce GraphQL responses, email threads, document content, and Slack message history are retrieved via MCP tools and integrated into the agent's context in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard instructions that might be embedded within the retrieved third-party data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses read/write capabilities within Salesforce (
dispatch,dispatch_readonly) and can render UI elements throughdisplay_widget. - Sanitization: While the skill emphasizes "grounding" and "citing every value exactly," it does not explicitly define sanitization or filtering logic for the content retrieved from external sources before synthesis.
Audit Metadata