find-internal-answer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by retrieving and processing content from external sources including Slack threads, emails, and internal documentation, which constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied questions and content retrieved from Slack, email, and document search results (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions potentially embedded within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
dispatch_readonlyanddispatchtools for Salesforce access, alongside generic search and read capabilities for communication and document platforms. - Sanitization: Absent. No mention is made of filtering, escaping, or validating the content retrieved from these sources before it is interpreted by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a specific, hardcoded tool call to verify Salesforce connectivity using a standard GraphQL identity query.
- Evidence: The skill instructs the agent to run
dispatch_readonly(method: "GET", url: "/services/data/v66.0/graphql", queryParams: { "queryInput": "{\"query\":\"query { uiapi { currentUser { Id } } }\"}" })to confirm server access regardless of reported connection status. This is a standard, low-risk diagnostic operation.
Audit Metadata