pi-coding-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool provides a built-in
bashtool and CLI shortcuts (!commandand!!command) that allow for arbitrary shell command execution on the host system as part of its interactive coding environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Through the
pi installcommand, the skill facilitates the downloading and installation of extensions, skills, and prompts from external sources including npm, git repositories (via HTTPS or SSH), and direct URLs. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Extensions and packages installed via the CLI are executed with full system access, creating a risk of unauthorized code execution if a user is prompted to install a malicious package.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The agent accesses and manages sensitive authentication credentials (e.g.,
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY) and stores them in~/.pi/agent/auth.json. Additionally, thereadtool permits the agent to access any file within the filesystem reachable by the user. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in project files could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent automatically discovers and reads instructions from project-level files such as
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md, and.pi/SYSTEM.md, as well as files explicitly referenced via the@symbol in the CLI. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify any delimiters or special markers used to isolate untrusted file content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities including
bashcommand execution, file system modification (write,edittools), and package management (pi install). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content ingested from local project files before it is processed by the model.
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