pr-title
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from the user's project, such as commit messages and code diffs, to provide context for PR title generation. This content is technically untrusted and could be crafted to include malicious instructions to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/gather_context.pyretrieves output fromgit log,git diff, and GitHub PR metadata. - Boundary markers: Data is passed to the agent as a structured JSON object, but the prompt lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the diff or log content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write back to GitHub using
gh pr editinscripts/update_title.py. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the data retrieved from the repository commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools (
gitandgh) through Python'ssubprocess.runfunction. The implementation correctly uses list-based arguments and avoidsshell=True, which is a secure practice that prevents standard command injection vulnerabilities when handling potentially variable input like the PR title.
Audit Metadata