wt-merge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the load-time execution pattern in the
SKILL.mdfile to populate project context (e.g.,git status,pwd,git branch). These commands are used for status retrieval and are considered benign in this implementation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external GitHub PR metadata, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the merge or reporting process.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
Contextsection inSKILL.mdwhich callsgh pr view. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the PR metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(git *)andBash(gh *)as defined in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill directly interpolates values extracted from tool outputs into its workflow.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple bash commands to perform its core functions. This includes potentially destructive operations like
git worktree remove --forceandgit branch -D. While these are legitimate parts of the skill's workflow, they are executed based on variables extracted from the environment and external PR data.
Audit Metadata