salla-app-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests user-supplied data (such as app names, descriptions, and custom onboarding fields) which is then used to configure application resources via the Salla Partners MCP.
- Ingestion points: Application metadata (name, description) in
SKILL.mdand custom form fields defined inreferences/onboarding-steps.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within user-supplied strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools for resource creation (
salla_apps), event subscription (salla_events), and code deployment (salla_functions). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or escaping logic is described within the skill instructions, though it notes that the remote API performs validation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and deployment of executable code through the
salla_functionstool. - Evidence: Users are guided to write and save serverless handlers (App Functions) to manage store events and onboarding logic. While this is the intended purpose of the skill, it represents a high-capability execution environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill involves executing a series of MCP tool actions (
action: 'create',action: 'connect',action: 'save') to modify the state of the Salla Partners account and its associated apps. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references
webhook.siteas a well-known service for testing webhook payloads. The skill provides clear and appropriate security guidance, explicitly warning the user to use only non-sensitive demo data and to avoid sending secrets or production tokens to the external capture service.
Audit Metadata