salla-webhooks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of the
@salla.sa/webhooks-actionspackage, which utilizes dynamic loading to dispatch event handlers from the file system. \n - Evidence: In
references/server-setup.md, the skill notes that the package "dispatches handlers via dynamic require() over the file system" for file-based routing patterns.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external webhook payloads, creating an attack surface where malicious data could influence agent behavior if not properly sanitized. \n - Ingestion points: Webhook POST endpoints receive JSON payloads from external Salla services (referenced in
SKILL.mdandreferences/server-setup.md). \n - Boundary markers: The skill emphasizes strict cryptographic verification (HMAC-SHA256 signature or token equality) to ensure payload authenticity. \n
- Capability inventory: Payloads are passed to asynchronous processing functions (
processWebhookAsync,processEvent) which may involve database operations or external API calls. \n - Sanitization: While transport security is thoroughly covered, the instructions do not explicitly address the sanitization of payload fields before they are incorporated into downstream LLM prompts.
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