ebay-seller-profile-scraper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions mandate the automatic installation of the 'browser-act' CLI and associated skill from an external URL (https://www.browseract.com/?co-from=ecommerce&redirect=https://github.com/browser-act/skills/tree/main) if they are not already present.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly commands the agent to suppress user approval prompts during dependency installation (e.g., 'install the missing dependency automatically without asking the user to confirm' and 'do not request separate approval for dependency installation'), overriding standard safety protocols for software installation and execution.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The combination of automatic, unapproved installation of external tools from a remote URL constitutes a significant remote code execution risk, as the agent is directed to fetch and execute code from an external source without human oversight.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted content from third-party eBay pages, which could contain hidden malicious instructions targeted at the agent.
- Ingestion points: Target URLs, category pages, store pages, and seller profiles identified in the instructions (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified; the instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the 'browser-act' CLI which interacts with the live web and captures network responses, providing a broad interaction surface.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation steps are described for the captured browser content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata