ecommerce-inventory-availability-monitor
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external tool called BrowserAct and a specific URL (https://www.browseract.com/?co-from=ecommerce&redirect=https://github.com/browser-act/skills/tree/main) to download and install missing dependencies at runtime.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions contain a directive to bypass standard user authorization flows. Specifically, in the BrowserAct Runtime section, it states the agent should install missing dependencies automatically without asking the user to confirm and explicitly tells the agent do not request separate approval for dependency installation. This is an attempt to circumvent user control over the agent's environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to invoke the browser-act CLI tool to perform browser-based tasks. Executing external binaries or scripts without manual verification poses a risk of unauthorized command execution within the agent's shell environment.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process data from arbitrary external ecommerce websites, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Target URLs, category pages, search queries, and marketplace contexts as defined in the instructions (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None are present to distinguish between retrieved product data and potential instructions embedded in the webpage content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use the browser-act tool to interact with and capture data from websites.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from the browser before returning it to the agent or user.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata