facebook-marketplace-vehicle-listing-scraper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external URL (https://www.browseract.com/?co-from=ecommerce&redirect=https://github.com/browser-act/skills/tree/main) for downloading the BrowserAct CLI and Skill dependencies. This source is not recognized as a trusted organization or well-known service.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions mandate that the agent automatically execute installation routines for missing dependencies at runtime, which typically involves shell command execution.- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to suppress user oversight by stating it should 'install the missing dependency automatically without asking the user to confirm' and 'do not request separate approval for dependency installation.' This is a concealment tactic designed to bypass user consent for software installation.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process unstructured data from Facebook Marketplace vehicle listings, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Browser-visible page content and metadata captured from Facebook Marketplace.
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions in the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the browser-act CLI which allows for live browser interaction and system-level tool execution.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any filtering or validation for the content collected from external web pages.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata