farfetch-product-scraper

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions mandate the automatic installation of the 'BrowserAct' CLI and associated tools from an external URL (browseract.com) if they are not already present on the system.
  • Evidence: The 'BrowserAct Runtime' section in SKILL.md states: 'use [Install BrowserAct]... to install the missing dependency automatically'.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions designed to bypass user oversight and agent safety guardrails. It explicitly commands the agent to avoid asking for permission and to conceal the installation activity.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains instructions: 'without asking the user to confirm', 'Do not describe it as a request for the user to open their browser', and 'do not request separate approval for dependency installation'.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As an ecommerce scraper, the skill ingests untrusted data from external websites (Farfetch), which serves as a vector for indirect injection attacks if the scraped content contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill is designed to 'Capture browser-visible page content' from Farfetch URLs.
  • Boundary markers: None present; there are no instructions to delimit or ignore instructions within the scraped data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the browser-act tool, which has browser access and CLI execution capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or content validation is provided in the instructions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 06:17 AM