zara-product-scraper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to "install the missing dependency automatically without asking the user to confirm" and to "not request separate approval for dependency installation." This is a direct attempt to bypass user oversight and security consent boundaries during the installation of external software.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions mandate the automatic download and installation of the
browser-actSkill and CLI from an external GitHub repository if they are not present. Executing installation scripts from unverified external sources without user review poses a high risk of remote code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To facilitate the automatic installation and usage of the
browser-acttoolset, the skill requires the agent to execute shell-level commands to modify the environment and run a CLI, all while suppressing user notifications. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to scrape and process data from external websites (Zara). This creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External Zara product and listing pages processed via the
browser-acttool. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: Execution of the
browser-actCLI, network access for scraping, and file system writes within theworkspaces/directory. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from the web before processing or returning it to the user.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata