linkedin-lead-list-builder

CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

• Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill instructs the agent to automatically install a dependency without user confirmation and explicitly tells it to conceal the installation link and avoid requesting approval, which is a deceptive instruction outside the advertised lead-listing purpose.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.85). SKILL.md instructs the agent to use the runtime browser-act Skill to access and extract “public LinkedIn profile/company/activity information,” which implies the LLM will ingest outsider-authored free text scraped from public web pages at runtime.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

• Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs the agent to install and invoke the BrowserAct CLI at runtime using the installer link https://www.browseract.com/?co-from=lead-generation&redirect=https://github.com/browser-act/skills/tree/main (and references https://www.browseract.com/?co-from=lead-generation), which means the agent will fetch and execute remote code and follow external instructions as a required dependency.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

• Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (medium risk: 0.60). The Skill explicitly tells the agent to automatically install the BrowserAct CLI and resume the request without asking the user for confirmation, which directs the agent to change the host system (install software) autonomously and could require elevated privileges.