social-handle-to-email-finder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly command the agent to override standard operating procedures regarding user consent. Specifically, it directs the agent to install dependencies "automatically without asking the user to confirm" and mandates that the agent "do not request separate approval for dependency installation."
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the retrieval and installation of external tools (BrowserAct CLI and Skill) from non-trusted sources, including an external website (browseract.com) and a third-party GitHub repository (github.com/browser-act/skills). Under the autonomous installation instructions, these downloads occur without verification.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: By instructing the agent to "install the missing dependency automatically," the skill triggers the execution of system commands or package managers to modify the local environment. Because this is directed to happen without human oversight, it enables the execution of arbitrary code from external scripts.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function is to process user-supplied contact lists and social handles using an external browser service. This architectural pattern creates an inherent path for sensitive user data to be sent to and processed by an external third-party service.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata