kuaishou-live-room-scraper
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to install missing dependencies 'automatically without asking the user to confirm' and to 'not request separate approval for dependency installation'. This overrides standard safety practices regarding user oversight of tool execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the 'BrowserAct' CLI as a runtime dependency. It provides a URL (browseract.com) for installation and instructs the agent to perform this installation silently if the tool is missing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute installation tasks for the 'BrowserAct' CLI automatically. Combining silent installation with third-party tools creates a risk of unauthorized software execution on the host system.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While primarily intended for scraping, the skill defines a process for collecting sensitive browser-visible data like 'chat samples', 'engagement context', and 'source references', which could be misused if directed toward unauthorized targets.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest untrusted data from live streams and chat rooms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Web scraping of Kuaishou live chat messages and room metadata in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions to separate data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: Uses the browser-act tool for web interaction and data collection.
- Sanitization: No mention of sanitizing or escaping the content scraped from the web before processing it.
Audit Metadata