gke-platform-security
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GKE cluster configurations and Kubernetes resources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if those resources are attacker-controlled.
- Ingestion points: Uses
gke:get_clusterandk8s:get_k8s_resourceto read live cluster state and resource definitions (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit instruction-data delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are defined for the data returned from the cluster.
- Capability inventory: Possesses significant modification capabilities including
gke:update_cluster,k8s:apply_k8s_manifest, and project-level IAM modifications viagcloudCLI (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for data retrieved from the cluster before it is processed by the agent or used in subsequent commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous
gcloudshell commands for modifying cluster security settings and project IAM policies. - Evidence: Recommends commands such as
gcloud container clusters update ... --enable-secret-manager,gcloud container clusters update ... --binauthz-evaluation-mode=..., andgcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding ...for execution (SKILL.md). While these are for hardening purposes, they represent a powerful execution capability.
Audit Metadata