golang-spf13-viper
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes patterns for ingesting configuration data from external, potentially untrusted sources, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the inputs contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Configuration enters the agent's context through
ReadInConfigfor files,AutomaticEnvfor environment variables, andReadRemoteConfigfor remote Key-Value stores like etcd and Consul, as described inreferences/sources-and-formats.mdandreferences/binding-and-env.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the configuration values.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with powerful tools including
Write,Edit,Bash,Agent, andWebFetchinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill advocates for structural validation via Go's type system and explicitly recommends a "validate-then-swap" pattern for hot reloads in
references/watch-and-reload.mdto mitigate the impact of malformed inputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the well-known
spf13/viperlibrary and integration with standard remote configuration services. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides thego get github.com/spf13/viper@latestcommand.references/sources-and-formats.mddetails connections to established remote providers such as etcd and Consul. These represent standard development practices. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes standard Go CLI tools for dependency management.
- Evidence: The
go getcommand is included inSKILL.mdto allow the agent to manage project dependencies.
Audit Metadata