Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes several well-known third-party libraries for PDF manipulation across Python and JavaScript environments. These include Python packages
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pandas, andpypdfium2, as well as JavaScript librariespdf-libandpdfjs-dist. These are standard tools for document processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill integrates various command-line utilities from the Poppler and QPDF suites (such as
pdftotext,pdftoppm, andqpdf) and provides custom Python scripts for specialized tasks. These scripts, such asscripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyandscripts/extract_form_field_info.py, use standard subprocess patterns and include documented logic to handle PDF form structures, including a runtime monkeypatch of thepypdflibrary to resolve a known bug with selection lists. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted PDF documents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through text extraction (using
pypdf,pdfplumber,pdftotext) and image analysis of document pages (usingpdf2imageand visual inspection). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings are used when presenting extracted text or image analysis results to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to read and write files on the local system and execute subprocesses via CLI tools and local Python scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from processed PDF documents before it is used by the agent.
Audit Metadata