heavy-think
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
deck.pyscript connects toapi.cloudflare.comandapi.typesafe.aito fetch scoring data used to rank and select 'lenses' for the agent council. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends the text of the user's question or problem description to external APIs (
api.cloudflare.comandapi.typesafe.ai). While Cloudflare is a well-known service, the transmission of arbitrary user input to external endpoints is a data exposure risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is a multi-agent orchestrator that ingests untrusted user input (the problem/question) and interpolates it directly into the prompts for sub-agents (e.g., in
brainstorm-agent-prompt.md,perspectives-prompt.md, etc.). - Ingestion points: User-supplied
--questionorPROBLEMstrings enter the context viadeck.pyand markdown templates. - Boundary markers: The templates use formal labels (e.g.,
PROBLEM:,CONSTRAINTS:) but lack robust 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents are granted access to tools like web search, file reading, and shell execution (in
references/harness.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the user-provided question text was observed before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
deck.pyscript executes local commands such ascf auth whoamito manage Cloudflare authentication for its scoring features.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: unknown (check file) - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata