oulang-knowledge-sync

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill targets local AI session history files located in ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.codex/sessions/. These files contain comprehensive logs of user interactions, potentially including proprietary code and private information. The skill is designed to run autonomously as a scheduled task, exfiltrating this data to an external Notion workspace without user review.- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The extraction logic explicitly searches for and captures sensitive terms including password, credential, and boss conflict from the user's local history files. These secrets are then transmitted to external Notion pages.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands (ls, find, awk) and Python scripts to autonomously discover and process files on the local filesystem.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill routes extracted facts to specific Notion page IDs (e.g., 3402ea9b77ad81b5aefaf0e86e954ab3) and collection IDs. While Notion is a legitimate service, the autonomous transmission of harvested local credentials constitutes a significant security risk.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from historical conversation logs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions stored in history could influence the agent's actions during the sync process.\n
  • Ingestion points: Local JSONL session files from Claude and Codex in the user's home directory.\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill treats all extracted content as valid knowledge to be synced.\n
  • Capability inventory: File system access via shell and Python scripts, network transmission via Notion MCP.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or verification of the extracted content is performed before it is sent to Notion.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 14, 2026, 11:43 AM