skills/sammcj/agentic-coding/tmux-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tmux-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions direct the agent to tell the user to "Allow-list tmux-cli once to avoid repeated approval prompts." This is an attempt to bypass the platform's security guardrails that require user confirmation for potentially dangerous CLI tool executions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends using ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no. This configuration disables host key verification, which is a critical security control to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks during remote connections.
  • [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES]: The skill requires the installation of an external tool called claude-code-tools via uv tool install. This dependency is not part of the standard environment and its contents are not verified within the skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to capture and process output from tmux panes (tmux-cli capture), which can include data from untrusted remote SSH hosts.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from tmux panes and remote shell environments (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to treat the captured output as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute commands (tmux-cli execute), send input to shells (send), and manage sessions.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the captured output before it is processed by the agent, creating a surface where a malicious remote shell could influence the agent's behavior via embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 19, 2026, 03:47 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tmux-cli