customer-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to enumerate contents of the local file system to identify other installed skills.
- Evidence: The 'Companion check' section in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to runls ~/.claude/skills/ ~/.agent/skills/ ~/.agents/skills/ .claude/skills/ .agent/skills/ .agents/skills/ 2>/dev/null. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains automated instructions that trigger specific behaviors and system commands immediately upon skill activation.
- Evidence: The 'Companion check' logic in
SKILL.mdforces the agent to perform a filesystem scan and offer to install additional software without a direct user request for that action. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends the installation of external code from a third-party source using a package runner.
- Evidence: Both
README.mdandSKILL.mdsuggest usingnpx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilledto download and install the primary skill and its recommended companions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted user-provided data without specified sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Processes survey responses, interview transcripts, and behavioral analytics data provided by the user (referencing
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to ignore embedded commands in the data being processed.
- Capability inventory: Access to the shell via
lsand tool invocation capabilities. - Sanitization: Absent; no logic is provided to escape or validate external content before processing.
Audit Metadata