edge-computing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The SKILL.md file contains a 'Companion check' instruction that directs the agent to execute a shell command (ls) on various hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g., ~/.claude/skills/). This is used to programmatically detect if recommended skills are currently installed.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill focuses on processing untrusted external data, such as HTTP request headers (CF-IPCountry, Cookie) and response bodies (response.text()), as shown in the Cloudflare Worker examples. This architecture creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested content contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through web requests and response transformations in the Worker code examples.
  • Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from treating data as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment includes file system inspection (ls), network operations (fetch), and environment management.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating external data before it is processed or interpolated.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (README.md and SKILL.md) provides instructions to download and execute code from a remote source (AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled on GitHub) using the npx skills add command for installation and management of related skills.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:03 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — edge-computing