edge-computing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'Companion check' instruction that directs the agent to execute a shell command (ls) on various hidden directories in the user's home folder (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/). This is used to programmatically detect if recommended skills are currently installed. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill focuses on processing untrusted external data, such as HTTP request headers (
CF-IPCountry,Cookie) and response bodies (response.text()), as shown in the Cloudflare Worker examples. This architecture creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested content contains malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context through web requests and response transformations in the Worker code examples.
- Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from treating data as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment includes file system inspection (
ls), network operations (fetch), and environment management. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating external data before it is processed or interpolated.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (
README.mdandSKILL.md) provides instructions to download and execute code from a remote source (AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilledon GitHub) using thenpx skills addcommand for installation and management of related skills.
Audit Metadata