employee-engagement
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to automatically execute a shell command to probe for installed skills in multiple hidden directories such as
~/.claude/skills/,~/.agent/skills/, and~/.agents/skills/during the first activation. This constitutes local environment fingerprinting without user initiation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions recommend downloading and executing code from an external repository using
npx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled. This repository is not identified as a trusted source, introducing a supply chain risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze external, potentially attacker-controlled survey data while having the capability to execute shell commands.
- Ingestion points: Employee survey results, pulse check data, and qualitative open-text responses processed in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or explicit instructions to treat survey data as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Command execution (
ls) and the ability to recommend further installation of external code (npx). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not define any validation or filtering for the survey data it processes.
Audit Metadata