git-advanced
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Companion checksection inSKILL.mdinstructs the agent to execute anlscommand targeting several directories, including hidden folders within the user's home directory (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/). This activity constitutes local environment scanning and software discovery without explicit user initiation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to recommend and facilitate the installation of additional tools from an external repository (
AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled). This source is not verified as a trusted vendor and the repository name does not match the provided author context, presenting a risk of installing unverified code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to process untrusted data from Git repositories (commit messages, logs, and diffs).
- Ingestion points: Git log output, commit messages, and file diffs processed during rebase and bisect operations.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to separate repository data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for
git,npm, andnpxcommands, as well as file system read/write access viagitoperations. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of repository-derived strings is documented.
Audit Metadata