git-advanced

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Companion check section in SKILL.md instructs the agent to execute an ls command targeting several directories, including hidden folders within the user's home directory (e.g., ~/.claude/skills/). This activity constitutes local environment scanning and software discovery without explicit user initiation.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to recommend and facilitate the installation of additional tools from an external repository (AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled). This source is not verified as a trusted vendor and the repository name does not match the provided author context, presenting a risk of installing unverified code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to process untrusted data from Git repositories (commit messages, logs, and diffs).
  • Ingestion points: Git log output, commit messages, and file diffs processed during rebase and bisect operations.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to separate repository data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for git, npm, and npx commands, as well as file system read/write access via git operations.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of repository-derived strings is documented.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — git-advanced