saas-metrics
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Companion check' section in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to execute a shell command (ls) to inspect specific skill directories on the user's filesystem, including paths like~/.claude/skills/,~/.agent/skills/, and~/.agents/skills/. This allows the agent to probe the host environment for installed software and configurations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to recommend and facilitate the installation of additional components using the
npx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilledcommand. This involves executing code from a remote registry, posing a risk of arbitrary code execution from a source that is not listed as a trusted vendor. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs both the user and the agent to interact with external resources hosted at
absolutelyskilled.proand associated GitHub repositories for installation and additional functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted SaaS and financial data provided by the user (ingestion point:
SKILL.md). It lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization instructions to prevent indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data to exploit the agent's available capabilities (capability inventory: filesystem inspection vialscommand inSKILL.md).
Audit Metadata