second-brain

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a 'Companion check' instruction that directs the agent to run an ls command on multiple hidden directories (such as ~/.claude/skills/ and ~/.agent/skills/). This constitutes environment discovery of other installed tools outside the skill's own data directory (~/.memory/).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation instructions in the README and SKILL.md recommend using npx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled to install the skill and its recommended companions. This pattern involves fetching and executing code from an external repository that is not identified as a well-known or trusted service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its automated memory loading mechanism. Ingestion points: It reads content from all markdown files in ~/.memory/ and the index.yaml registry file. Boundary markers: The loading logic does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the stored memories. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to create directories (mkdir), list files (ls), and perform persistent writes/deletes within the user's home directory. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or verification of the content retrieved from the local memory files before it is injected into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — second-brain