technical-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to automatically perform an environment scan upon activation to check for recommended companion skills.
- Evidence: The instruction in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to runls ~/.claude/skills/ ~/.agent/skills/ ~/.agents/skills/ .claude/skills/ .agent/skills/ .agents/skills/ 2>/dev/nullto identify installed skills. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to process and review user-provided technical documentation, API specifications, and runbooks without explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic.
- Ingestion points: User-provided documentation, architecture designs, and API specs processed in
SKILL.mdand thereferences/directory. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters (e.g., XML tags) for untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent retains the ability to execute shell commands and read filesystem paths as demonstrated by the companion check instructions.
- Sanitization: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to escape or validate external content before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user and the agent to install additional components using the
npx skillsutility from the author's repository. - Evidence: Instructions in
README.mdandSKILL.mdrecommend runningnpx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled --skill <name>to extend capabilities.
Audit Metadata