technical-writing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to automatically perform an environment scan upon activation to check for recommended companion skills.
  • Evidence: The instruction in SKILL.md directs the agent to run ls ~/.claude/skills/ ~/.agent/skills/ ~/.agents/skills/ .claude/skills/ .agent/skills/ .agents/skills/ 2>/dev/null to identify installed skills.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to process and review user-provided technical documentation, API specifications, and runbooks without explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided documentation, architecture designs, and API specs processed in SKILL.md and the references/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters (e.g., XML tags) for untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent retains the ability to execute shell commands and read filesystem paths as demonstrated by the companion check instructions.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No instructions are provided to the agent to escape or validate external content before processing.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user and the agent to install additional components using the npx skills utility from the author's repository.
  • Evidence: Instructions in README.md and SKILL.md recommend running npx skills add AbsolutelySkilled/AbsolutelySkilled --skill <name> to extend capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 03:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — technical-writing