muapi-ai-clipping
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external video URLs and the resulting API metadata (such as
titleandhook_sentence). This introduces a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the source content contains instructions meant to influence the agent. - Ingestion points: The agent reads data from the
muapi.aiAPI response, specifically theshortsarray containingtitleandhook_sentence(found inSKILL.mdunder Output Schema). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or warnings for the agent to treat the API-returned content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell script execution (
run-ai-clipping.sh) and interactions with themuapi-clitool to perform network operations and file uploads. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the text fields returned by the API before they are presented to the user or processed further.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local shell script located at
library/edit/ai-clipping/scripts/run-ai-clipping.sh. This script is responsible for resolving video paths, performing uploads, and invoking themuapi-clito handle the clipping process.
Audit Metadata