muapi-chibi-collage-effect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations by sending user-provided image URLs and an API key to the
api.muapi.aidomain via themuapiCLI orcurl. While these operations are necessary for the skill's primary function, the destination domain is not a whitelisted source for data transfer. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external image data which is used to influence the AI's generation of stickers, poses, and captions, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
person_imageURL provided by the user, as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructional warnings are present to separate the external content from the generation prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
muapiCLI tools (muapi image edit,muapi predict wait) andcurlfor network requests to external image processing endpoints. - Sanitization: The skill performs no local validation or sanitization of the input URL; it relies entirely on the external API's internal moderation filter, which is explicitly configured to a
lowlevel.
Audit Metadata