muapi-ugc-ads-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
muapiCLI tool (e.g.,muapi image edit,muapi predict wait) andcurlfor interacting with the MuAPI service. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to
api.muapi.aiviacurlto submit and poll for media generation tasks when CLI aliases are not available. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface by interpolating untrusted user-supplied data (
product_name,human_image,product_image) directly into prompts for image, script, and video generation models. - Ingestion points: Inputs defined in
SKILL.md(product_name,human_image,product_image) are used in Phase A and Phase B prompts. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the user-provided product details or image metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
muapi,curl) and perform network requests, which increases the impact if an injection occurs. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings or URLs is performed before they are interpolated into the system prompts.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to handle a sensitive credential (
MUAPI_API_KEY) by passing it through shell environment variables and HTTP headers (-H "x-api-key: $MUAPI_API_KEY"). While using environment variables is a common practice, the agent is actively managed to use this secret in shell contexts.
Audit Metadata