muapi-ugc-lifestyle-try-on
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests several user-defined inputs such as
product_name,model_description, andsettingwhich are directly interpolated into natural language prompts for image generation models. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious input could attempt to override model instructions or influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Inputs
product_name,model_description,setting, andplatformdefined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate user data from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: Access to shell command execution via the
muapiCLI andcurltool. - Sanitization: No input validation or filtering is specified before the inputs are used in prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands using the
muapiCLI tool to perform image editing tasks. While this is the intended functionality, it involves passing user-supplied parameters to a subprocess. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to perform string substitution of
{{input_name}}placeholders with user-supplied text before executing shell commands and API requests. Assembling executable commands from unsanitized user strings at runtime is a potential vector for command injection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to an external domain
api.muapi.aiusingcurl. While these requests are for legitimate API interaction (passing an API key for authentication), the domain is not on the predefined trusted list.
Audit Metadata