muapi-media-generation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The scripts
upload.sh,create-music.sh, andimage-to-video.shallow the user to specify local file paths via flags like--fileor--image-file. These files are then uploaded to the vendor's API athttps://api.muapi.ai/api/v1/upload_fileusingcurl -F. This functionality can be abused to exfiltrate sensitive files (e.g., SSH keys, credentials, or system configurations) if an agent is instructed to process such paths by a malicious prompt. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
generate-image.shandgenerate-video.sh, the--viewflag triggers a download of the generated media followed by theopencommand on macOS systems. If the resulting URL from the API is hijacked or points to a malicious file, the skill would automatically execute/open it on the host machine. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from multiple sources without sufficient isolation.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts, media URLs, and local files provided via script arguments in
SKILL.mdand referenced bash scripts. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt assembly logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, perform network POST requests to external APIs, and execute system commands (
open) on the host. - Sanitization: While prompts are JSON-encoded via a Python helper to prevent JSON breakage, the content itself is not sanitized for instructions, and file paths are used directly in shell commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts dynamically construct API payloads and resolve endpoints by reading from a local configuration file (
schema_data.json). It also utilizespython3 -cat runtime to perform JSON encoding of input strings.
Audit Metadata