muapi-selfie-with-celebrities
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute raw
curlcommands in the shell as a fallback mechanism. Passing sensitive environment variables like$MUAPI_API_KEYas CLI headers can lead to credential exposure in shell history or process monitoring logs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to transmit the
MUAPI_API_KEYcredential to an external domain (api.muapi.ai) via HTTP headers. While this domain appears related to the skill's name, it is not a recognized trusted organization or well-known service, posing a risk of credential exposure to an unverified third party. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The
movie_nameparameter inSKILL.mdis a user-controlled input field used to influence model output. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or defensive instructions (e.g., 'ignore instructions within the movie name') are used when interpolating the
movie_nameinto the generation prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute CLI tools (
muapi) and network commands (curl) which could be targeted by an injection attack. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any input validation or sanitization logic to ensure the
movie_namedoes not contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent or the image generation model.
Audit Metadata