brainstorm-experiments-new
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdandreferences/sandbase-api-map.mddescribe fetching "current external evidence, search, scraping, [and] enrichment" through thesandbase_runtool. - Boundary markers: The skill contains instructions to "Preserve the user's chosen stack, source material, and authorization boundaries" and requires obtaining confirmation before paid execution, though these do not programmatically isolate the content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
sandbase_runto execute remote capabilities andsandbase_run_getto poll results. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the external content retrieved from search or scraping before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dynamic pattern to discover and execute remote functionality.
- Evidence: The workflow involves calling
sandbase_discoverto find capabilities by task rather than using static endpoints, andsandbase_runto execute them based on a live schema retrieved viasandbase_inspect. This results in runtime-determined execution paths for remote logic.
Audit Metadata