content-translator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided text for translation and localization, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where hidden instructions in the source text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External text content provided by the user for translation and localization as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or boundary markers to isolate the text being translated from the agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
strale_translatetool via thesandbase_call_toolinterface to perform translation tasks. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize, filter, or escape the input text before processing it.
Audit Metadata