content-translator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided text for translation and localization, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where hidden instructions in the source text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: External text content provided by the user for translation and localization as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or boundary markers to isolate the text being translated from the agent's system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the strale_translate tool via the sandbase_call_tool interface to perform translation tasks.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize, filter, or escape the input text before processing it.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 27, 2026, 11:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — content-translator