video-generator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data, including creative briefs, visual references, and narrative descriptions, which serves as an entry point for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Creative briefs, user-owned images, brand rules, and reference examples provided in Phase 1 and Phase 2 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are instructed for the agent to use when interpreting these external inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses sandbase_run for external API interactions and "local media tools" for file operations like concatenation, mixing, and frame extraction (SKILL.md, Phase 7).
  • Sanitization: While the skill mandates using schema-defined arguments for API calls, it lacks specific instructions for sanitizing user inputs before they are processed by local media utilities or interpolated into generation prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to utilize "local media tools" for deterministic operations such as frame extraction, concatenation, and audio mixing. This typically involves the execution of command-line utilities (e.g., ffmpeg), creating a surface for command injection if parameters derived from user-supplied filenames or metadata are not properly sanitized.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external generative models provided by SandBase. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, it involves the transmission of user-provided references to external infrastructure. The instructions include positive security constraints, such as treating references as private data and preventing the unauthorized cloning of real faces or voices.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 11:46 AM