review-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'maker' agent is instructed to process verdicts and findings returned by a spawned 'checker' agent. This data flow creates a vulnerability where instructions embedded in a finding could influence the maker agent's logic during the implementation or fix phase.
- Ingestion points: Findings and verdicts are received from the
adversarial-reviewerspawned via the Task/Agent tool as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for the checker's output are defined in the skill instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill context includes the ability to execute shell commands, modify code files, and spawn additional sub-agents.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of the checker's findings is specified before the maker agent interprets them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to execute shell commands for targeted testing, QA, and git version tracking (
git rev-parse HEAD). These capabilities are necessary for the skill's primary purpose of behavioral change verification but represent an broad execution surface.
Audit Metadata