using-superpowers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs high-pressure directives to override the agent's default decision-making process. Instructions such as "YOU ABSOLUTELY MUST," "YOU DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE," and "This is not negotiable" are used to force the agent to invoke the
Skilltool even when it might appear unnecessary. The documentation explicitly states that these skills "override default system prompt behavior." - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a systemic workflow that mandates loading external instructions from "skill" files before the agent provides any response or clarification to the user. This significantly increases the surface area for instructions from external files to influence or control agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
Skill(Claude Code),skill(Copilot), andactivate_skill(Gemini) tools described inSKILL.mdare used to pull in external instructional content. - Boundary markers: While the skill includes a priority list stating user instructions take precedence, it lacks explicit sanitization or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content of the loaded skills themselves.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation references the use of powerful capabilities across platforms, including shell access (
Bash), subagent dispatch (Task), and file system operations (Write,Edit), as seen inreferences/codex-tools.mdandreferences/gemini-tools.md. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization mechanism is described for the content fetched and interpreted by the skill-loading tools.
Audit Metadata