google-tts
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface during the podcast creation workflow where untrusted user documents are parsed and given to the agent to draft a conversational script.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context from external documents (PDF, DOCX, Markdown, TXT) parsed via
scripts/extract.pyas detailed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit boundaries or instruction delimiters defined to prevent the agent from honoring instructions embedded within the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes local Python scripts (
extract.pyandgoogle_tts.py) and interacts with the external Google TTS API viaurllib.request. - Sanitization:
scripts/extract.pyincludes aclean_textfunction that strips formatting markup (Markdown, HTML, code blocks, URLs), but it does not sanitize or validate the natural language content against malicious prompt injection payloads. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
scripts/google_tts.pyinvokessubprocess.run()to callffmpegfor audio chunk concatenation. - Evidence: This execution passes arguments safely via a list structure without enabling
shell=True, mitigating command injection risks and validating the static analyzer heuristic signal as benign.
Audit Metadata