gmail-inbox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes email body content from external, untrusted sources (incoming emails).
- Ingestion points:
scripts/gmail_unified.py(specifically theget_message_detailfunction which fetches the full email body). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to differentiate untrusted email content from its own system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can send emails (
send_message), reply to threads (reply_to_message), and modify labels. The agent also has access to theBashtool for general system operations. - Sanitization: Absent. Email bodies are decoded from Base64 and returned as plain text without filtering or validation.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The inclusion of email-sending capabilities (
gmail.sendscope) allows the agent to transmit data externally. In an adversarial scenario triggered via indirect prompt injection, this could be used to exfiltrate sensitive information accessed by the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts to interact with the Gmail API. These scripts manage sensitive OAuth tokens and account configurations (
credentials.json,token_*.json,gmail_accounts.json). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on standard, well-known libraries for authentication and API interaction, including the Google API client libraries and
python-dotenv.
Audit Metadata