onboarding-kickoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration script
scripts/onboarding_post_kickoff.pyusessubprocess.run()to execute other Python scripts. While it correctly uses list-based arguments (avoiding shell=True), the arguments are derived from external webhook payloads (e.g.,service_type,target_location), creating a surface for argument injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (Google Maps business names and scraped website content) and interpolates it directly into LLM prompts in
scripts/casualize_company_names_batch.pyandscripts/instantly_create_campaigns.py. An attacker could manipulate business names or website content to influence the agent's behavior during the 'casualization' or 'campaign creation' phases. \n - Ingestion points: Google Maps API results and website scraping ingested by
scripts/gmaps_lead_pipeline.pyand processed inscripts/casualize_company_names_batch.py. \n - Boundary markers: Prompts use structured examples but lack explicit 'ignore instructions' delimiters for the user-supplied data. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
onboarding_post_kickoff.py), write to Google Sheets (update_sheet.py), and send emails via the Gmail API (onboarding_post_kickoff.py). \n - Sanitization: There is no significant sanitization or validation of the scraped strings before they are interpolated into the prompt.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several scripts that are not included in the provided file set, specifically
execution/scrape_apify.py,execution/enrich_emails.py, and imports likescrape_google_mapsandscrape_website_contacts. This makes the full behavior of the skill unverifiable and suggests a reliance on external, unprovided code.
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