clone-ui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves ingesting and processing untrusted third-party data from external websites (HTML, CSS, JS, and screenshots). This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if a target website contains malicious directives designed to override the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: External content is fetched via tools and stored in
.clone-ui/source/files such asraw.htmlandrendered.html. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to treat this content as untrusted data rather than instructions, suggesting a mental boundary of
<UNTRUSTED_EXTERNAL_CONTENT>. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands via helper scripts, perform network requests via browser automation, and spawn sub-agents for verification.
- Sanitization: The skill implements a 'Hard guardrail' requiring the agent to scan all external content for injection patterns (such as 'ignore previous instructions' or shell commands) and halt execution if they are detected in a directive context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local helper scripts (
save-tool-result.ps1andsave-tool-result.py) to manage large JSON payloads from tool results. These are executed via the shell (pwshorpython). The documentation suggests that users manually add these scripts to their agent's permission allow-list to facilitate the workflow. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes an adversarial sub-agent (
Agent()call) during its verification phase to perform an independent audit of the cloned output. It also relies onevaluate_scriptcalls via browser automation to interact with and extract data from live web pages.
Audit Metadata