mail-destinations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a migration template for a
MailServletinSKILL.mdthat ingests untrusted data from HTTP request parameters and interpolates it into email headers and body without sanitization, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection or mail header manipulation. - Ingestion points: The
doPostmethod in theMailServletsnippet (fileSKILL.md) callsrequest.getParameterforto,subject, andbodyfields. - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not include boundary markers or explicit instructions to the agent to treat this data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides instructions to implement a network-capable email transmission flow using
Transport.sendMessageand custom SOCKS5 proxy logic inConnectivitySocks5ProxySocket.javaandOnPremiseSMTPTransport.java. - Sanitization: The example code lacks validation, escaping, or filtering of external content before it is processed by the mail session.
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