scaffold
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources to influence code generation and validation steps, creating a potential surface for instructions embedded in documentation to be executed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves information using MCP tools
get_usage_guide,get_component_api, andget_component_examples, as well as reading the local filelibs/mcp-server/src/data/usage-guides.ts. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings are used to instruct the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested usage guides or examples.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
WriteandEdittools to create/modify source code, and theBash(nx *)tool to execute build commands. - Sanitization: The skill does not implement explicit sanitization or validation logic for the content retrieved from the MCP server or documentation files before using it to generate component templates or logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include the execution of shell commands to validate the generated components.
- Evidence: Phase 6 explicitly directs the agent to run
nx run <project>:buildorng buildto verify compilation. While these are restricted to thenxandngCLIs in a development context, they involve executing complex build pipelines based on generated code.
Audit Metadata