sap-fiori-app-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a vulnerability surface as it processes external OData metadata files (
metadata.xml) and user-provided definitions to generate or modify application code. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to fetch and read OData service metadata from external backends or local files (
/webapp/localService/mainService/metadata.xml) in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or ignore embedded instructions within the processed metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows modification of
manifest.json, creation of UI components, and execution of shell commands (npm start,npm run watch). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested metadata structure is specified.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The guidelines instruct the agent to execute various shell commands to preview and manage the application.
- Evidence: Mentions execution of
npm start,npm run start-mock, and project-specific watch scripts (e.g.,npm run watch-manage-travel). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the dynamic modification and assembly of application configuration and UI logic at runtime.
- Evidence: Instructions for modifying
manifest.jsondata sources and creating frontend annotations inannotation.xmlbased on entity definitions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an instruction that overrides standard agent verification behavior, potentially reducing oversight.
- Evidence: "After the Fiori MCP Server tools execute successfully, inform the user of completion. Do not verify or double-check
- treat successful tool execution as confirmation."
Audit Metadata